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Abstract
How is it that we know what a dog and a tree are, or, for that matter, what knowledge is? Our semantic memory
consists of knowledge about the world, including concepts, facts and beliefs. This knowledge is essential for
recognizing entities and objects, and for making inferences and predictions about the world. In essence, our
semantic knowledge determines how we understand and interact with the world around us. In this chapter, we
examine semantic memory from cognitive, sensorimotor, cognitive neuroscientific, and computational perspectives.
We consider the cognitive and neural processes (and biases) that allow people to learn and represent concepts,
and discuss how and where in the brain sensory and motor information may be integrated to allow for the
perception of a coherent “concept”. We suggest that our understanding of semantic memory can be enriched by
considering how semantic knowledge develops across the lifespan within individuals.

Keywords: Semantic memory, Concepts, Distributional Semantic Models, Categories, Abstraction, Generalization,
Knowledge, Grounded Cognition, Sensory-motor, Embodiment

1. What is semantic memory?

2. What is semantic memory for?

What do psychologists mean when they use the
term semantic memory? Almost half a century ago, in
1972, Endel Tulving suggested partitioning the human
long-term memory system into two distinct stores: an
episodic store that contains memories that are linked to
a particular time and place (e.g., where you parked your
bicycle this morning), and a semantic store that
contains more general knowledge about the world (e.g.,
what a bicycle looks like, or is used for). Tulving’s
proposal was widely adopted, and now many
psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists consider
episodic and semantic memory to be components of the
declarative (or explicit) branch of the long-term memory
system. Motor knowledge about how you actually ride a
bicycle, in contrast, is generally described as a
procedural skill that is part of another branch of longterm memory—the non-declarative, or implicit memory
system. This system encompasses knowledge to which
we do not have conscious access, but that nevertheless
affects our behavior (Squire, 1987).

Imagine seeing something, say a dog, for the very
first time. It has various attributes, such as a particular
shape, motion, smell, sound, color, feel, fur length, and
collar. When you see the same animal again a week
later, its fur length and smell might be different (perhaps
it has recently been bathed and groomed), and it might
be wearing a different collar. But its shape, motion,
color and bark are the same. Thus, across your two
experiences with the animal, some attributes were more
constant (shape, sound, color) than others (fur length,
smell and collar). By being sensitive to the frequency of
the animal’s various attributes across episodes of
experiencing it, you might derive (or abstract) a
representation of the concept dog (we use the label
“dog” for convenience, but the same process would
work for an animal we do not have a name for) in which
the aspects that are most commonly shared across
those episodes are most heavily weighted, and the
aspects that those episodes share less frequently have
less weight.

Early neuropsychological evidence supported the
view that episodic memory is distinct from implicit
memory, and is at least partially distinct from semantic
memory. Amnesic individuals (i.e., people with episodic
memory deficits) for example, are able to learn new
procedural skills (e.g., maze solving and mirror reading,
Cohen & Squire, 1980; Milner et al., 1968) and acquire
some new semantic knowledge (e.g., the names of new
famous people; O’Kane et al., 2004), despite having no
episodic memory of having learned these things.

The regularities gleaned via the process of
abstraction allow generalization based on this concept.
Therefore, when we see another thing for the first time,
to the extent that the new thing’s attributes are similar to
those that are included in our concept (and taking into
account the weights), we can link that new thing with
the dog concept we formed earlier. Thus, another furry,
four legged barking animal would be more strongly
associated with the concept dog than would a cat,
which would in turn be more strongly associated with
the concept than would a table or a lemon.
Furthermore, once we have associated the new animal
with our dog concept, properties of the dog concept that
are not, at a particular moment, evident in the new
animal can nevertheless be generalized (i.e., mapped
on) to the new animal, allowing us to make predictions
about aspects of the new animal that we have not
directly perceived (e.g., how a new instance of a dog
will behave when someone scratches its ears).

Although such neuropsychological evidence does
suggest that episodic, semantic, and implicit memory
systems are at least partially distinct, there is also
evidence that the semantic system is not completely
independent of either episodic or implicit knowledge. In
fact,
detailed
behavioral,
computational,
and
neuroimaging investigations suggest that semantic
memory is part of an integrated memory system – a
system that is grounded in the sensory, perceptual, and
motor systems, and that is distributed across multiple
brain regions. In other words, there is now good
evidence (some of which we describe later in this
chapter) that there is in fact no strict division between
semantic memory and the sensory, motor, and episodic
information from which semantic information is acquired
originally.
In what follows, we discuss semantic memory from
cognitive, sensorimotor, cognitive neuroscientific, and
computational perspectives. Although much of the
presentation focuses on semantic memory for concrete
objects, along the way we will see that many of the
same issues that concern concrete objects are also
relevant for abstract concepts, actions, and events, as
well as for the features of each of these.

Thus, it is via abstraction that we can, as infants (or
perhaps later in life), discover that there is a type of
thing that is a dog or a lemon, and it is via
generalization that we can apply this knowledge to new
instances. Even as adults who possess more-or-less
fully developed conceptual knowledge, abstraction and
generalization continue to be necessary for learning
about new things and for applying existing knowledge
(imagine moving to the USA from Europe, where poison
ivy doesn’t grow, and having to abstract, from
examples, which plants to avoid because they are
poison ivy, and then applying that knowledge on a
hike). The example above is intended merely to give a
flavor of how the abstraction process might work. In
fact, there may not be a single “abstraction process”,
rather there may be several distinct properties of the
memory system which each contribute to the aspects of
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memory we refer to as “abstract” . In the final sections
of this chapter, we describe a number of computational
models of semantic memory that use computational
mechanisms that can support abstraction, not all of
which, in fact, require forming semantic representations
per se.
Now that we have considered what semantic
memory is for, we turn to considering how it is
structured and organized.

3. What is the structure and
organization of semantic memory?
What is your semantic representation of a dog or a
tree made up of, and how are these representations
organized with respect to one another? In the semantic
memory literature, researchers have attempted to
answer these questions from both cognitive and
cognitive
neuroscientific
perspectives.
Cognitive
approaches typically focus on how concepts may be
internally structured, acquired, and organized with
respect to one another. In contrast, cognitive
neuroscientific approaches have focused primarily on
how they are organized, using what is known about the
structure and functional architecture of the human brain
to constrain models. Although cognitive neuroscientific
approaches often have little to say about how concepts
are acquired and internally structured, the currently
dominant class of cognitive neuroscientific models,
sensorimotor-based models, are an important
exception. We begin this section by briefly summarizing
the most prominent cognitive models of how concepts
are internally structured. We then turn to theories of the
organization of semantic knowledge, with a focus on
cognitive neuroscientific approaches.

3.1 What is a concept made of?
Historically, the three most prominent cognitivelyoriented theories of the internal structure of concepts
have been classical definitional approaches, prototype
theory, and exemplar theory. In what follows, we briefly
introduce each. For a detailed consideration of these
issues, refer to the chapter in this volume by Goldstone,
Kersten, and Carvalho (2017).

1

In this chapter we use the term abstraction in two related ways: 1) as
explained above, to refer to the process of deriving information across
instances that may not be available from any individual instance (in
other work, this is sometimes called induction or generalization), and
2) as discussed in subsequent sections, to refer to different levels of
abstraction, i.e., differences in degree of detail or precision, where the
less detail there is, the greater the level of abstraction, e.g., poodle vs.
dog vs. animal. It is easy to imagine that the way that the abstraction
process (in the first sense) is implemented produces different levels of
abstraction (in the second sense). We reserve the term
“generalization” for the related process of applying that abstracted
knowledge to novel situations (cf. Altmann, 2017), that is, doing
something with that knowledge. We consider these issues in further
detail in Sections 6-8 (see also Barsalou, 2016, for further
discussion).

According to the classical theory of concepts, which
dates back at least as far as the ancient Greeks,
concepts can be thought of as definitions that are built
from simpler concepts (e.g., bachelor = unmarried +
man). Thus, deciding if someone is a bachelor is a
matter of checking whether they are both unmarried
and a man. The definitional approach has fallen out of
favor, in part because for most concepts, agreeing on a
precise definition is difficult or impossible (e.g., what
defines a game? Wittgenstein, 1953).
Prototype theory (Rosch, 1978) avoids the problem
of deciding how to define concepts by positing that
concepts are probabilistic, rather than having a
definitional structure. That is, for each concept (e.g.,
dog), we encode a list of features (e.g., has four legs,
has fur, barks) that are weighted by how frequently that
feature has occurred in the dogs we have encountered.
When we encounter a new dog, we attempt to match it
to these weighted features, with the degree of match
determining the likelihood that we will generalize, or
correctly classify the new thing as a dog. Prototype
theory has an interesting consequence. If what we think
of as the most typical dog (e.g., size, shape, color, fur
length, etc.) is a weighted average of all the dogs we
have encountered, this average may be something we
have never actually experienced (for review, see
Murphy, 2002). Although in their most basic form,
prototypes are unorganized lists of features (e.g., the
features has wings and flies are not predictive of one
another), there is evidence that we remember concepts
better if the features “make sense” according to our
prior knowledge (e.g., if the feature wings goes with
files, rather than with swims; Murphy & Allopenna,
1994). This suggests that we do attempt to organize
features with respect to one another. In addition, a
number of recent versions of prototype-style theories
incorporate
statistical
aspects
of
featural
representations, such as feature distinctiveness (Cree,
McNorgan, & McRae, 2006; Randall, Moss, Rodd,
Greer, & Tyler, 2004), and correlations among features
(McRae, de Sa, & Seidenberg, 1997; Tyler & Moss,
2001).
But do we really need a stored list of weighted
features to decide that a new thing is a member of a
category? Exemplar models (Medin & Schaffer, 1978;
Smith & Medin, 1981) posit that we do not. Instead,
according to exemplar models, to decide if something
that we encounter is, for example, a dog, we compare it
to each of our previous experiences with dogs (all of
which we have stored). The more similar it is to those
dog exemplars, the more likely we are to decide that it
is a dog. Like prototype theory, the exemplar model
also predicts that classifying a never-before
experienced thing as a dog may be easier than
classifying an atypical dog that you have previously
seen; something we have never seen can be more
similar to our stored exemplars for a category than one
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of those stored exemplars is to the rest (consider a
2
novel spotted Labrador, compared to a Chihuahua) .
There is currently no clear consensus on whether
exemplar or prototype models best fit human behavior.
However, in an intriguing recent article, Murphy (2016)
argued that there never has existed a coherent overall
exemplar theory of concepts. Murphy’s arguments
notwithstanding, if we consider that the summary
descriptions described in the prototype model must
originally develop from examples, it seems likely that
remembered exemplars play an important role,
especially in the development of conceptual knowledge.
It may be the case, however, that as more and more
examples continue to be encountered, we also store
representations that reflect what is most common
across all of those exemplars. That is, we may store
abstractions. We consider abstraction further in
subsequent sections (see also the chapter in this
Handbook by Gureckis).

3.2 How are concepts organized?
We now turn to considering models of how
conceptual knowledge is organized. We pay special
attention to sensorimotor theories because of their
influence on the field and because, as we will see, their
architecture allows them to address not only the
organization of conceptual knowledge, but also its
acquisition and internal structure.

Hierarchical models
We learn in biology that organisms can be classified
using a hierarchical system (e.g., a tree is a plant, and a
plant is a living thing). Classical cognitive psychological
theories describe the organization of knowledge in
semantic memory in the same way—as a hierarchy that
is structured according to the relations between
concepts. There is some psychological evidence for
hierarchical structure. For example, individuals are
slower to identify that a tree is a living thing than that a
plant is a living thing, a finding which has been
interpreted as reflecting the greater distance to be
travelled in the hierarchy to verify the statement (Collins
& Quillian, 1969, but cf. Smith 1978). However, after
controlling for potentially confounding factors that could
have slowed verification responses for more distant
properties, such as association between the terms, it
2

Although categorization is performed differently in exemplar and
prototype models, the process of conceptualization (e.g., imagining a
typical dog when someone mentions dogs in general) results in the
two sets of models making similar predictions. According to the
exemplar model, each time we imagine a typical dog, we produce
something similar to a weighted average of all of our dog exemplars,
which would then provide another exemplar for our set of dogs
(Hintzman, 1986). This exemplar would be experienced frequently
(via all of the times we think about dogs when they are not there),
resulting in a stored “best example” which would be similar to a
prototype/stored summary description. It would be different from a
prototype, however, in that this “best” exemplar would not have any
special status. That is, like any other instance of experience, it would
be a reflection of, rather than a description of, the category.

has been difficult to obtain empirical evidence that
people do routinely use hierarchies to store and retrieve
conceptual knowledge (Murphy et al., 2012). For these
and other reasons, strict hierarchical models of
semantic organization are unlikely candidates at the
moment.

Neurally-inspired models
In early work, Warrington & McCarthy (1983)
described an individual who had more difficulty
identifying non-living things than living things. Soon
thereafter, Warrington and Shallice (1984) described
several patients exhibiting the opposite pattern: more
difficulty identifying living than nonliving things. These
individuals with brain injuries inspired two influential
neural models of the organization of semantic
knowledge: 1) domain-specific category-based models;
and 2) sensory-functional theory, as well as its
successor, sensorimotor-based models. Below we
describe each in turn.
Domain-specific/category-based models
Patterns of deficits like the ones described above
suggest that brain damage can differentially affect
categories (or domains) of objects, such as living
versus nonliving things. One way to account for this
pattern is to posit that different categories of objects are
processed in distinct brain regions. The domain-specific
category-based model (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) is
based on this idea. In this model, due to evolutionary
pressures, human brains developed dedicated fast and
accurate neural mechanisms for recognizing a few
categories that are particularly relevant for survival or
reproduction (animals, plant life, conspecifics, and
tools). Moreover, because efficiently recognizing each
of these categories requires different mechanisms, the
adaptations produced a neural organization in which the
categories
have
distinct,
non-overlapping
representations. This is not to say, however, that these
representations must be localized to circumscribed
brain regions. A more recent extension of this model,
the distributed domain-specific hypothesis, suggests
that categories are distributed across the brain, albeit in
distinct, non-overlapping neural regions (see Mahon &
Caramazza, 2009, for a review).
Sensory-functional theory
Rather than interpreting their early observations of
individuals with category-specific deficits as evidence
that conceptual knowledge in the brain adheres to a
category-based organization, Warrington and Shallice
(1984) hypothesized that sensory and functional
information contribute to create conceptual knowledge,
and that different categories of knowledge tend to rely
on these two types of information to different extents.
For instance, according to sensory-functional theory,
representations of living things tend to depend more on
visual information than do artifacts, which depend more
on information about their function. This means that
even without semantic memory being categorically
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organized per se, if access to one type of information is
compromised, deficits could appear to be categoryspecific (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Warrington &
McCarthy, 1987). Although sensory-functional theory
was highly influential, the existence of patients whose
deficits are not consistent with a sensory-functional
division indicates that semantic knowledge cannot be
captured by a simple two-way divide (see Mahon &
Caramazza, 2009, for a review).
Sensorimotor-based models
Sensorimotor-based models (also known as
“grounded”, or “embodied” models) are an extension of
sensory-functional theory. However, in these models,
sensory information is divided into as many attributes
as there are types of sensory input. According to Alan
th
Allport, who revived such models in the late 20
century, the sensorimotor systems through which we
experience the world are also used to represent
meaning. “The essential idea is that the same neural
elements that are involved in coding the sensory
attributes of a (possibly unknown) object presented to
eye or hand or ear also make up the elements of the
auto-associated activity-patterns that represent familiar
object-concepts in ‘semantic memory’” (Allport, 1985, p.
3
53) . In recent decades, several models have made
similar claims from perspectives that are linguistically
oriented (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), cognitively oriented
(Barsalou, 1999) and cognitive neuroscientifically
oriented (Damasio, 1989; Pulvermuller, 1999). These
models are appealing because unlike many others, they
make specific predictions about how semantic
information is obtained in the first place (via sensory
and motor experience), as well as how and where in the
brain this information is processed (in the sensory and
motor systems in which it was acquired). For a detailed
discussion of this perspective, we refer the reader to the
chapter in this volume by Matheson and Barsalou.
A large body of research now supports
sensorimotor-based models. Numerous functional
neuroimaging,
neuropsychological,
and
neuromodulatory (e.g., TMS: transcranial magnetic
stimulation) studies converge to suggest that semantic
knowledge for a given object concept is built around its
sensory and motor attributes (e.g., its color, shape,
smell, and how people use it). These attributes are
distributed across brain regions that underlie sensory
and motor processing (for reviews see Gainotti, 2000;
Kiefer & Pulvermuller, 2012; Noppeney, 2009; Yee et
al., 2013). Consequently, at present, most semantic
memory researchers would agree that conceptual
representations are, at least in part, represented in
sensorimotor systems. Active areas of research explore
(1) How, and/or where, in the brain this sensorimotorbased information may be combined (or bound) into a
coherent concept from a jumble of features, and
3

The ideas, however, go back at least 300 years to the British
empiricist philosophers, John Locke and David Hume.

perhaps relatedly, (2) How sensorimotor-based
information might be integrated to produce a
representation that involves the sensory and motor
systems to differing degrees depending upon the
situational demands.
One method for binding features is believed to
involve synchronous neural activity. That is,
semantically coherent representations may be created
by integrating patterns of synchronized neural activity
representing different aspects of sensory and motor
information (e.g., Singer & Gray, 1995; Schneider et al.,
2008). Another (compatible) possibility is that there are
regions of cortex that function as hubs in that they
receive and combine input from multiple modalityspecific areas. These hubs are hypothesized to not only
bind together features, but to also transform their input
such that they represent similarity among concepts that
cannot be captured based on individual sensory or
motor modalities (for review, see Patterson et al.,
2007).
Although most hub models are silent regarding how
they determine which inputs are integrated, an early
sensorimotor-based model proposed solving this
problem by integrating the concept of hubs (which, in
this model, are referred to as convergence zones) with
that of temporal synchrony (Damasio, 1989). According
to the convergence zone framework, not only do
convergence zones combine input from multiple areas,
they also reflect synchronous activity within the areas
from which they receive input. Moreover, the
convergence zone framework posits that multiple levels
of convergence zones (i.e., a hierarchical structure) are
necessary to build up semantic representations (see
Simmons & Barsalou, 2003, and McNorgan et al., 2011
for evidence consistent with multiple levels of
convergence zones from brain damaged and healthy
participants, respectively).
There currently is considerable evidence that there
are brain regions (in particular, in the anterior temporal
lobe and angular gyrus) that function as hubs or
convergence zones (for reviews of neuropsychological
and neuroimaging evidence for hubs, see Binder, 2016,
and Patterson et al., 2007, respectively). Through
integrating input from multiple areas, these regions may
support abstraction and generalization. We return to the
neural regions supporting these processes in Section 6.

3.3 Summary of the structure and
organization of semantic memory
Where does this consideration of cognitive and
neurally oriented models of semantic memory leave us?
First, it is worth noting that it has been argued that the
hub/convergence zone architecture described above
could not only bind features into objects, but, in an
analogous fashion, higher order convergence zones
could bind objects into generalized events (e.g., making
toast; Damasio, 1989). It also has been suggested that
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mechanisms that receive and integrate input about
sensory and motor features are likely to extract
statistical regularities across these features that
correlate with taxonomic categories. In other words, a
hub/convergence zone architecture could allow a
category-like topography to emerge from sensorimotor
input without the need to posit pre-specified divisions
among categories, or a strictly hierarchical taxonomic
organization (Simmons & Barsalou, 2003).

“gateway” to semantic memory—that is, that semantic
memory must be acquired via episodic memory (see
Squire & Zola, 1998 for review), although eventually,
semantic information may exist independently. In
contrast, Tulving (1991) argues that, “new information
could be stored in semantic memory in the absence of a
functioning episodic system, as presumably happens in
very young children and in lower animals without
episodic memory” (p. 20).

Second, both of the cognitive models that we have
considered, that is, prototype and exemplar models,
are, in principle, compatible with the two current models
of the organization of semantic memory (domainspecific and sensorimotor models). Although domainspecific category-based models are committed to the
existence of neural regions dedicated to a few,
evolutionarily relevant categories, these models are
silent about how, within these categories, knowledge is
represented, as well as about how all other categories
of knowledge might be represented. Likewise, although
sensorimotor-based models posit that concepts are
acquired via sensory and motor experience, and are at
least partially represented in sensory and motor
cortices, they are also silent about whether the
categories that we form are based on a single,
probabilistic representation (i.e., a prototype) or stored
exemplars.

Evidence from individuals with severe episodic
memory deficits can help address the question of
whether a functioning episodic memory system is
necessary to acquire new semantic knowledge. For
instance, research with the famous amnesic patient
H.M. revealed that after the surgery that led to his
amnesia, he acquired some new semantic knowledge
(e.g., for words that came into common use after his
surgery; Gabrieli et al., 1988; cf. O’Kane et al., 2004).
Two other individuals who became amnesic as adults
have also exhibited some, albeit extremely limited, new
semantic knowledge after the illnesses that led to their
amnesia (Bayley & Squire, 2005; Bayley et al., 2008).
Furthermore, individuals who have had amnesia since
early childhood appear to have relatively intact
semantic knowledge, despite the fact that they had little
time to acquire semantic knowledge when their episodic
system was intact (Bindschaedler et al., 2011; Gardiner
et al., 2008; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). Although
such evidence seems to suggest that semantic
knowledge can be acquired without an intact episodic
memory system, it is worth noting that semantic
knowledge acquisition in these amnesic patients is not
normal (e.g., it is acquired very slowly and laboriously).
It is therefore possible that these patients may possess
sufficient remaining episodic memory to allow for the
acquisition of semantic knowledge (Squire & Zola,
1998). Another (compatible) possibility is that the
acquisition of semantic memory normally makes use of
the episodic system, but that other (less efficient) points
of entry can be more heavily relied upon when the
episodic system is damaged (or has not yet developed
fully).

Although our current understanding of categorization
behavior and the organization of the neural systems
supporting semantic memory does not allow
determining whether prototype or exemplar models are
more plausible, it seems likely that examples play an
important role in the development of conceptual
knowledge. In the next section, we discuss evidence for
the importance of such examples. We also consider
evidence that as development proceeds, conceptual
knowledge may gain the flexibility to rely more or less
heavily on the sensorimotor systems (see Gureckis,
2017).

4. How is semantic memory
acquired?
Clearly, to know things about the world, such as
what strawberries look and smell like, that bicycles have
two wheels, or that elephants have DNA, we must have
learned that information during some episode(s). These
experiences may be direct, such as actually
encountering strawberries, or through language, such
as learning about a type of fruit that we have never
seen. However, does this mean that all information in
semantic memory begins as information in episodic
memory (i.e., as information that is linked to a specific
time and place)? Or can information be incorporated
into our semantic memory even if we were never able to
explicitly recall the episode(s) in which we were
exposed to it? Opinions on these questions differ. Some
authors have argued that episodic memory is the

What might be some of these “points of entry”? As
one might imagine given the prominence of
sensorimotor-based models, sensory and motor
information that may be acquired implicitly is an obvious
candidate. And in fact, there is clear evidence from
studies on the development of conceptual knowledge in
young children that sensory and motor information are
important for developing semantic knowledge about
object concepts. Some of this evidence comes from
studies examining how young children categorize and
make inferences about novel objects. For example,
when two-year old children were presented with a novel
object and instructed to move it horizontally, they were
more likely to consider it to be similar to (i.e., to
categorize it with) another novel object whose long axis
extended horizontally than one whose long axis
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extended vertically, whereas the preference reversed
for children who moved the original novel object
vertically (Smith, 2005). Thus, motor information has an
implicit influence on their categorization, which
presumably affects their conceptual representations.
Like 2-year olds, at ages 4-5, young children also
show a tendency to prioritize sensory/perceptual
information when categorizing objects, as indicated by
their inferences about the objects. After learning to label
novel creatures as either “ziblets” or “flurps” based on a
rule that did not correlate with overall perceptual
appearance (e.g., ziblets have more fingers than
buttons, but are not otherwise perceptually similar to
one another), children were shown a new target
creature, told that it had a hidden property (in this case,
thick blood) and asked which of two other new
creatures also had thick blood. Children consistently
selected the creature that had more overall perceptual
similarity to the target creature, rather than the creature
that, based on the fingers-to-buttons-ratio rule, had the
same label (Sloutsky et al., 2007). Thus, at 4-5 years of
age, perceptual information that is derived implicitly
appears to play an important role in developing
semantic knowledge about object concepts, and
perhaps a larger role than the explicitly learned label.
Such demonstrations with young children suggest that
statistical regularities in their sensory and motor input
may allow them to form new object concepts, without
the need to depend on explicitly learned information.
There is little controversy about the claim that for
infants, sensorimotor information is essential to the
acquisition of semantic knowledge about object
4
concepts . However, a central question about semantic
memory is whether there is a developmental shift with
respect to the role of sensorimotor information in object
knowledge. Common sense suggests that there should
be. Adults have many ways to develop semantic
representations for new object concepts (e.g., through
verbally described definitions, “jicama is a root
vegetable”, or through analogy, “jicama has a texture
similar to an apple, but it tastes kind of like a potato”).
Infants, however, must rely entirely on the sensory and
4

Debate continues, however, between nativist and empiricist
accounts of conceptual development. In nativist accounts, infants’
interpretation of the sensorimotor input is constrained by innate
biases or “theories”, for example, that there are core domains of
knowledge like objects, animates, and number (Carey, 2009; Spelke
et al., 1992). Empiricist accounts claim that there is sufficient structure
in the input that concepts can be learned from perceptual experience
with the aid of innate general-purpose cognitive biases. That is, there
is no need for innate biases that pertain specifically to conceptual
knowledge (for review, see Sloutsky 2010; Rakison & Lawson, 2013).
Both views agree that for older children and adults, hearing common
labels for objects promotes categorizing those objects as instances of
the same concept. According to the nativist view, humans have an
innate predisposition to assume that words refer to concepts
(Markman, 1990), whereas according to the empiricist view, words
initially have no more weight than other sensory or motor information,
but that over development, words gain a more prominent role in
categorization as children learn that labels are predictive of category
membership (Sloutsky et al., 2001; Deng & Sloutsky, 2012).

motor information that is available to them when they
experience the object (e.g., their own experience of the
jicama’s taste, smell, texture, and feel).
Empirical evidence is also consistent with a shift.
Although young children rely more on perceptual
similarity than on labels when making inferences (or
predictions) about unseen object properties (e.g.,
Sloutsky et al., 2007, described above; for a review, see
Rakison & Lawson, 2013), older children and adults are
more strongly influenced by category labels and by
higher order regularities -- that is, by regularities that
may be detectable across instances of experiencing an
object concept. For example, older children and adults
are more inclined than younger children to group a car
together with a bicycle, presumably in part because of
the knowledge that both are used for transport. To
explain this shift, Sloutsky (2010) proposed that a
“selection-based system may subserve [certain types
of] category learning by shifting attention to categoryrelevant dimension(s) and away from irrelevant
dimension(s). Such selectivity may require the
involvement of brain structures associated with
executive function...[and] there is evidence that many
components of executive function critical for learning
sparse categories exhibit late developmental onset ...”
(p. 1249; cf. Rogers & McClelland, 2004 for a
connectionist account of developmental changes in
conceptual organization).
Hence, the evidence supports the (common sense)
idea that as children develop, their semantic
representations increasingly rely on abstracted
information, that is, information that is grounded less in
direct sensorimotor experience and that depends more
on higher order statistical regularities and category
labels. We return to the process of abstraction in
Sections 6 and 7. However, first we consider whether
semantic knowledge is ever “fully developed”. That is,
we consider whether changes to, or long-term
differences in, experience can result in discernable
differences in semantic knowledge across adults.

5. Individual differences in semantic
memory
Given the fact that semantic memory is often
referred to as “general world knowledge”, it seems
obvious that individual differences in semantic memory
should exist. After all, depending on your experiences,
you may or may not know the capital of Vermont or
what an ocelot looks like. It follows that cultural factors
can be important sources of differences in conceptual
processing (see the chapter in this volume by Yap, Ji, &
Hong). Perhaps more surprisingly, there are also subtle
differences in what different individuals know (or
believe) about more common things, such as a trumpet,
hammer, or bird, as well as differences in how we
categorize them or view their similarity to one another.
Moreover, if sensorimotor-based models are correct in
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positing that experience determines conceptual
representations, then to the extent that experiences
differ, representations must differ as well. In this
section, we consider individual differences in semantic
knowledge.

5.1 Differences in categorization
On the surface, categories may appear to be fixed.
Once you learn what hammers or birds are, intuition
suggests that these are stable categories that neither
vary across time within an individual, nor across
individuals. However, behavioral evidence suggests
that even the broad categories that we use to organize
the world differ across individuals, as well as within an
individual (across the lifespan). When asked to indicate
which is more closely related, a robin and a nest, or a
robin and a duck, East Asians are more likely to select
the robin and nest than are Westerners (Ji et al., 2004).
This selection reflects sensitivity to thematic, or eventbased, relations. Thematic, in contrast with taxonomic,
knowledge concerns what or how things typically “go
together”, or play complementary roles in the same
action or event. Individual differences can also be found
within a culture. Among Western participants, some
adults exhibit a consistent preference to categorize
thematically,
while
others
prefer
to
classify
taxonomically (e.g., categorizing robin with duck; Lin &
Murphy, 2001), and these preferences remain
consistent across implicit and explicit measures
(Mirman & Graziano, 2012). Moreover, at as young as
age three, children show stable preferences for either
thematic or taxonomic categorization, and these
preferences can be predicted by aspects of their play
and language behavior at 13 months and at 24 months,
5
respectively (Dunham & Dunham, 1995) . Interestingly,
these preferences may change over development—
there appears to be a shift during young childhood
whereby younger children strongly prefer to categorize
thematically, but this bias weakens as children get older
(for review, see Markman, 1990). Although the reason
for this shift is unknown, it has been suggested that it
may be related to developing language abilities (e.g.,
knowing that robins and ducks are both called birds
might encourage infants to search for commonalities
between robins and ducks; Waxman & Markow, 1995).
In addition to individual, cultural, and developmental
differences in the broad categories that we use to
organize the world, there are also more subtle
differences across individuals in how semantic
knowledge is organized and represented. We next turn
to some examples of such differences, starting with how
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Specifically, children who at age 3 prefer to categorize taxonomically
exhibited more pointing behavior and labeling of individual objects at
13 and 24 months, respectively. In contrast, children who prefer to
categorize thematically at age 3 exhibited more relational play and
use of relational terms at 13 and 24 months (Dunham & Dunham,
1995).

expertise with actions or objects
individual’s semantic knowledge.

influences

an

5.2 Expertise-induced differences
Differences in expertise can produce behaviorally
and neurally measureable differences in conceptual
activation. For instance, professional musicians can
identify pictures of musical instruments more quickly
and accurately than can novices (non-musicians), while
no such difference is found for common objects.
Moreover, this pattern is reflected neurally. For
professional musicians, pictures of musical instruments
activate auditory association cortex and adjacent areas
more so than do pictures of common objects, with no
such difference being found for novices (Hoenig et al.,
2011).
Analogous findings have been reported for ice
hockey experts. Simply listening to sentences
describing hockey actions (but not everyday actions)
activates premotor regions more in hockey experts than
in novices (Beilock, Lyons, Mattarella-Micke, Nusbaum
& Small, 2008). Thus, the brain regions that are
differentially activated for experts (in these two studies,
auditory for musicians, and premotor for hockey
experts) appear to be due to their specific types of
experience. Moreover, the fact that these regions are
active when the experts perform tasks that do not
require accessing musical or action knowledge
suggests that these aspects of experience have
become part of their semantic representations of
instruments and actions, respectively.
Within non-experts, there is also evidence of
experience-based differences in conceptual knowledge.
Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, and Thompson-Schill (2013)
found that performing a sequence of hand motions that
are incompatible with those used to interact with
frequently manipulated objects such as pencils disrupts
thinking about such objects more than it disrupts
thinking about less frequently manipulated objects, such
as tigers. Critically for the current point, participants’
ratings of their degree of manual experience with an
object predicted the degree of interference that the
manual task produced. Moreover, for non-experts, like
for the experts described above, experience with an
object affects its neural representation. When listening
to an object’s name, activation in a brain region
involved in performing object-related actions (left
parietal cortex) correlates with participants’ ratings of
their amount of lifetime tactile experience with an object
(Oliver, Geiger, Lewandowski & Thompson-Schill,
2009).
Even just a few weeks of sensory or motor
experience can produce differences in neural activity
during conceptual activation. For instance, Kiefer, Sim,
Liebich, Hauk, and Tanaka (2007) trained participants
to classify novel objects while either pointing at them or
pantomiming actions toward them. After three weeks,
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when participants simply made judgments on the
objects’ written names, EEG source analysis revealed
that participants who had been trained to pantomime at
the objects, but not those who had been trained to point
at them, showed early activity in motor regions and later
activity in occipito-parietal visual-motor regions.
Analogous findings have been reported for novel
objects for which olfactory experience was either
present or absent (Ghio et al., 2016). These and related
findings (Cross et al., 2012; Oliver, Parsons, &
Thompson-Schill, 2008; Ruther et al., 2014a; Weisberg,
Turennout, & Martin, 2007), suggest that years of
experience are not required to impact the neural
representations of concepts—shorter-term differences
in sensorimotor experience can have a measurable
impact as well.

5.3 Bodily-induced differences
Differences in sensory or motor experience can be
larger and more pervasive than those described above.
And as might be expected (given what has been
observed for differences in expertise and in relatively
short-term
experience),
larger,
bodily-induced
differences in experience, such as the absence of input
in a sensory modality, can also affect semantic
representation. For example, for sighted, but not for
blind individuals, implicit similarity judgments about
fruits and vegetables are influenced by color similarity
(Connolly et al., 2007). Importantly, this is true even for
blind participants who have good explicit color
6
knowledge .
However, the dramatic differences in sensory
experience between early blind and sighted individuals
do not always produce detectable differences in
behavioral measures of semantic knowledge, or in its
neural organization. For instance, when making
judgments that in sighted individuals are thought to rely,
in part, on processing visual motion (e.g., is chiseling a
hand action with a tool?), both blind and sighted
participants selectively activate a brain region that in
sighted individuals receives input from an area
associated with processing visual motion (left posterior
middle temporal gyrus, which receives input from area
V5/MT; Noppeney et al., 2003). Moreover, blind and
sighted participants show category-specific (e.g.,
animals vs. artifacts) activation in ventral stream brain
regions that, in sighted participants, are associated with
visual processing (ventral temporal and ventral occipital
regions; Mahon et al., 2009). Such findings may appear
to be incompatible with sensorimotor-based theories,
which posit that differences in visual experience explain
6

Interestingly, blind and sighted individuals did not differ in their
judgments about household items—a distinction that is consistent with
evidence suggesting that color’s importance in an object’s
representation depends upon how useful it is for recognizing the
object (e.g., color is important for distinguishing lemons from limes,
but not for distinguishing toasters from microwave ovens; see Tanaka
& Presnell, 1999, for review).

why ventral “visual” brain regions respond differently to
different categories of stimuli (e.g., between animals
and tools). However, given that it is well-established
that neural plasticity results in reorganization of the
cortex if visual input is absent (for a review, see Amedi,
Merabet, Bermpohl & Pascual-Leone, 2005), it may be
that in blind individuals these ventral regions are
sensitive to non-visual factors that correlate with hand
action and with the living/non-living distinction (e.g.,
shape information that is acquired tactilely). Thus, the
knowledge represented in these regions may still be
based on experience, but not on visual experience.
A similar argument can help reconcile a
sensorimotor-based account with another result that
may seem to challenge it. It has been proposed that
understanding an observed action (e.g., shooting a
basketball) is based, at least in part, on the observer’s
ability to perform a “motor simulation” of the observed
action (e.g., Rizzolatti et al., 2001). However, there is
evidence that the absence of motor experience does
not necessarily impair knowledge of actions. When
presented with videos of actions, individuals born
without/with severely shortened upper limbs can
recognize, remember, and anticipate actions as
accurately
as
typically
developed
participants
(Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 2016). This finding
indicates that knowledge about actions is not
necessarily based on the ability to perform those
actions (even though such knowledge might ordinarily
be represented in that way). Nevertheless, it is perfectly
compatible with the idea that action knowledge (and
indeed, conceptual knowledge more generally) is
experience-based. That is, for individuals with
experience performing actions, action knowledge will be
supported by that experience, but for individuals without
experience performing actions, action knowledge will be
supported by whatever experience they do have of
actions, which would include experience visually
perceiving them.
Importantly, it appears that the absence of a specific
type of sensory or motoric information does not
necessarily produce impoverished representations (or if
it does, differences are subtle and difficult to detect).
Instead, we suggest that there may be a sort of
conceptual compensation (or adaptation) whereby the
information that is available becomes particularly
important and informative for representations, at least
when the system has had time to adapt or has never
developed reliance on a specific modality. Thus, just as
experts appear to have different conceptual
representations in their areas of expertise compared to
novices, individuals with different bodies should also
have different (and not necessarily more or less
informative) representations. One example of how
representations can differ based on long-term bodily
experience comes from a highly pervasive individual
difference—which hand is typically used to interact with
an object. Kan and her colleagues have reported that
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pictures of tools (but not pictures of non-manipulable
things like animals) activate left premotor cortex more in
right-handers than in left-handers (Kan, Kable, Van
Scoyoc, Chatterjee & Thompson-Schill, 2006; see
Willems, Hagoort & Casasanto, 2010, for related
7
findings).
Together, the studies described in this section
indicate that the organization of semantic knowledge,
and its neural representation, can be affected by both
large and small individual differences in sensory or
motor abilities. More importantly, they show that with
differences in long-term experience, representations
can develop differently or adapt, such that semantic
knowledge that grows out of nonidentical sets of
processes can nevertheless be equally informative.

5.4 Summary of individual differences in
semantic memory
A fundamental prediction of sensorimotor-based
theories is that object concepts include knowledge that
is represented in, or processed by, the sensorimotor
regions that are routinely active when that object is
perceived or interacted with. This means that
individuals with different experiences should have
different representations and that even within an
individual, as experience changes, that individual’s
representations should change as well. Such individual
differences may seem problematic because it would
mean that no two individuals’ concepts of, for example,
lemon will be exactly the same, and perhaps more
disconcertingly, that your own concept of lemon
changes, albeit probably subtly, over time. However,
the data described above suggest that this is, in fact,
what happens.
Much of the research described in Section 5 shows
how individual differences in conceptual knowledge
manifest as differences in the manner in which different
brain regions are recruited, whether through differences
in expertise, or through differences in sensory or motor
experience. In the next section, we review more broadly
the role of different brain regions in conceptual
representation.

6. Which brain regions support
semantic memory, and how?
We suggested in Section 3 that there is ample
evidence
from
the
neuroimaging
and
neuropsychological literatures to support sensorimotorbased models of semantic memory, which claim that
the brain regions involved in perception and action also
7

Perhaps surprisingly, abstract concepts’ representations may also
be influenced by differences in individual experience. Right-handers’
have a tendency to associate “good” with “right” and “bad” with “left”;
whereas left handers show the opposite pattern (Casasanto, 2009).
Intriguingly, this pattern can be reversed when right hand dominance
is compromised due to stroke, or even a brief (12 minute) laboratoryinduced handicap (Casasanto & Chrysikou, 2011).

support meaning. Several of the studies in the previous
section provide converging evidence by showing that
the sensory and motor areas supporting semantic
knowledge appear to change as sensory and motor
experience changes. However, there is also general
agreement that the neural representation of semantic
knowledge extends beyond activation in modalityspecific regions. In a comprehensive meta-analytic
review of functional neuroimaging studies, Binder et al.
(2009) identified several non modality-specific regions
that consistently have been implicated in tasks requiring
semantic knowledge. These include the inferior parietal
lobe (including the angular gyrus), large portions of the
lateral and ventral temporal lobes, and several parts of
the frontal lobe including the inferior frontal gyrus.
A complete discussion of these brain regions is
beyond the scope of this chapter (see the chapter by
Matheson & Barsalou for an in-depth discussion).
Instead, we limit our discussion to the inferior frontal
gyrus, the angular gyrus, and the anterior temporal lobe
because these regions have often been characterized
as “general” semantic areas. That is, they are
discussed as being heteromodal in supporting multiple
modalities of input (e.g., visual and auditory) and
multiple categories of semantic knowledge (e.g.,
animals and artifacts). Evidence from cognitive
neuroscience suggests that each of these brain regions
may support semantic knowledge in different ways.
The inferior frontal gyrus, for instance, appears to
support semantic processing by virtue of promoting the
selection of contextually appropriate information
(Thompson-Schill et al., 1997). Notably, however, the
inferior frontal gyrus is thought to support generalpurpose selection, meaning that although this region
frequently acts in the service of semantic processing, it
also supports selection in non-semantic tasks (for
review, see Thompson-Schill, 2003).
The angular gyrus has often been put forth as an
important heteromodal association area by virtue of its
location between visual, auditory, spatial and
somatosensory association areas (for discussion, see
Binder, 2009). There is some evidence that this region
has a particularly important role in supporting the type
of thematic or event-based semantic knowledge that
was introduced in Section 5.1 (e.g., that dog is related
to leash; Humpheries et al., 2007; Kalenine et al., 2009;
Mirman & Granzino, 2012; Schwartz et al., 2011; de
Zubicaray et al., 2013). However, because some
studies have not linked thematic knowledge in particular
to the angular gyrus (see Jackson et al., 2015), more
research is needed to understand the specific
conditions under which this region may support
thematic knowledge or processing (Kalenine &
Buxbaum, 2016).
The anterior temporal lobe (ATL) has received
perhaps the most attention in the literature on the
neural representation of semantic knowledge. One
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reason for this is the existence of a neurological
condition called semantic dementia, which, early in the
progression of the disease, often is characterized by
relatively focal degeneration in the ATL. Individuals with
semantic dementia have semantic memory deficits such
as problems with naming, recognizing, and classifying
objects, regardless of the category of knowledge. In
contrast, other cognitive functions are relatively spared.
Thus, the ATL appears to support general semantic
knowledge (see Hodges & Patterson, 2007, for a
review).
Functional neuroimaging studies of unimpaired
individuals also implicate the ATL in general semantic
processing. For instance, Tyler et al. (2004) had people
name pictures using either basic level labels such as
dog or hammer or superordinate level labels such as
animal or tool. They found that the ATL (specifically, the
perirhinal cortex, and primarily in the left hemisphere)
was more active when people named pictures using
basic level labels, as compared to superordinate level
labels. In contrast, a region of the posterior temporal
lobe (fusiform gyrus, bilaterally) was activated equally
during naming at the two levels. These results are
consistent with the idea that the ATL supports object
categorization, and that the amount of ATL involvement
is a function of how much detail is needed to perform
the targeted level of categorization (see Rogers et al.,
2006 and Rogers & Patterson 2007 for related findings
8
and discussion).
How might the ATL support semantic processing?
Recordings
of
neural
activity
(via
magnetoencephalography) show that during basic level
naming of visually presented objects, there are more
recurrent interactions between anterior and posterior
(fusiform) regions of the left temporal lobe than during
superordinate level naming (Clark et al., 2011). Given
the posterior fusiform’s involvement in processing visual
features of objects, it is possible that the ATL functions
as the “hub” of a network that facilitates the integration
of information across features, and that such integration
is necessary for categorization tasks such as
determining that an image depicts a dog rather than a
cat (see Martin & Chao, 2001). Furthermore, the ATL’s
involvement increases as a function of discrimination
demands (Clark et al., 2011). Or, to use the vocabulary
we used in Section 2, the ATL may support
generalization by supporting the process of applying our
existing semantic knowledge to the input, in this case to
categorize it.
Thus, the ATL’s greater involvement in basic relative
to superordinate level categorization (Tyler et al., 2004;
Rogers et al., 2006) may not be due to containing the
8

Recent work also considers whether different sub regions of the
ATL, or the left versus right ATLs, may support different aspects of
semantic knowledge (e.g., social knowledge, verbally-mediated
semantic knowledge, non-verbal semantic knowledge; for reviews,
see Gainotti, 2015; Lambon-Ralph et al., 2017).

perceptual information required for finer-grained
discrimination. Rather, the integration that occurs in this
region may produce a similarity space that is organized
in a way that reflects relationships among multiple
features. In this space, higher-order relationships may
play a more important role than perceptual information
(see Rogers et al., 2004). Thus, when the goal is to
match (i.e., categorize) a perceptually presented item
with a region of this similarity space, the task is more
difficult when attempting to match the input with
narrower categories (e.g., dogs) than with broader
categories (e.g., living things) because narrower
categories require accessing more of that item’s
9
perceptual representation in posterior regions .
More broadly, there is evidence to suggest that
integration and abstraction may occur throughout the
ventral temporal lobe (e.g., the ventral visual pathway;
Tanaka 1996), producing a posterior to anterior gradient
of abstraction. Specifically, more posterior regions
reflect information that is based more closely on
perceptual features, whereas more anterior regions
reflect information that, due to integration across
features, is somewhat more complex. In particular,
anterior regions may reflect higher-order abstract
relationships among features. Findings from several
studies support this type of gradient (Chan et al., 2011;
Grabowski et al., 2001; Kable et al., 2005; Hsu et al.,
2011), and many others are consistent more generally
with the idea that semantic knowledge is represented at
different levels of abstraction (or is integrated to
different degrees) in different regions (Fernandino et al.,
2015).
Having different levels of abstraction may help
alleviate a potential concern regarding sensorimotorbased accounts of conceptual knowledge. If concepts
are sensorimotor-based, one might worry that thinking
of the concept of lemon could cause one to hallucinate
a lemon, which people generally do not. Furthermore,
thinking of the concept of kicking could elicit a kick,
which could be embarrassing or perhaps even
dangerous. Yet if concepts are indeed also represented
at a more abstract level than that underlying direct
9

This characterization, of basic level categorization requiring more
processing than superordinate level categorization, may seem at odds
with the well-established phenomena of basic level naming typically
being privileged relative to superordinate level naming (e.g., basic
level names are learned earlier during development, and, under
unspeeded conditions, objects are named faster at the basic, relative
to the superordinate level; Rosch, 1976). However, the basic level
advantage in naming is likely due to the fact that it is more common to
name objects at the basic than at the superordinate level (leading to
stronger object-label associations at the basic level), not that
recognizing objects at the superordinate level requires more
processing. Recent behavioral evidence supports the idea that
superordinate level recognition does not require additional
processing. Under speeded conditions, categorization at the
superordinate level is privileged relative to categorization at the basic
level (Rogers & Patterson, 2007; Mack & Palmeri, 2015), and
information needed to categorize at the superordinate level is
available earlier than information needed to categorize at the basic
level (for review, see Clarke, 2015).
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sensation and action, then when thinking about, for
example, kicking, the regions that underlie the motor act
of kicking do not need to be sufficiently active to
produce a kick.
In the next section, we change gears somewhat to
review
computational
models
of
conceptual
representation that are not based on sensorimotor
information. Although much of semantic knowledge
comes from direct experience with objects and actions,
a great deal of it does not. People learn a huge amount
from spoken and written language. We have knowledge
of places that we have never been, and of people that
we have never met. The computational models
described in Section 7 derive semantic knowledge from
language input only. Despite being based solely on
“abstract” input (language), they successfully capture
many aspects of human semantic memory. In a sense,
the success of such models can be considered a
testament to the power of abstraction.

7. Computational Models of Semantic
Representation
So far, we have focused on cognitive and
neuroscientific models of semantic memory. The former
are driven by functional considerations, such as the
functions that memory serves, and the functional
architecture of distinct memory systems. The latter are
driven by how functions relevant to memory appear to
be organized across different regions of the brain. In
this section, we focus on computational models of
semantic representation. Such models have the
potential to explain how the nature of the input, or the
algorithms operating over that input, constrain the
organization of semantic memory, and how the learning
process impacts that organization. However, the utility
of computational models in understanding semantic
memory from a psychological perspective depends on
the extent to which the principles governing their
operation may be assumed to correspond to
psychologically relevant constructs, rather than
reflecting implementational choices designed to
increase their ability to predict behavior irrespective of
psychological plausibility. In what follows, we try to
highlight the psychologically relevant constructs.
Recent work has obtained a proxy of mental
semantic similarity by employing statistical processes
that operate across either large databases of humangenerated features (McRae, Cree, Seidenberg, &
McNorgan, 2005; Vinson & Vigliocco, 2008), or across
behavioral measures such as free association (Abbott,
Austerweil, & Griffiths, 2015). Although these
approaches have both had considerable success
predicting human performance, they are limited in that
neither one addresses how representations may be
created in the first place (Jones, Hills, & Todd, 2015).

Many current computational models of semantic
representation
do
address
how
semantic
representations may develop in the first place. These
distributional
semantic
models
use
statistical
experience (i.e., regularities in the environment) to
construct semantic representations. Although for
practical purposes, “experience” in these models is
usually restricted to a large corpus of text, the models
are in principle statistical learners that can be applied to
any data that can be represented to them. In the
discussion that follows, we use the terms ‘word’ and
‘linguistic context’ because this is typically the input to
the models, but in principle, these could be replace with
‘object’ or ‘event’, and physical or temporal context.
While there are now many distributional semantic
models in the literature, they are all based on the
distributional hypothesis, which is that words that
appear in similar linguistic contexts are likely to have
related meanings (Firth, 1957; Harris, 1970). For
example, car may frequently co-occur with wheel,
driver, and road. As a result, the model can infer that
these words are related in some way. In addition, the
model can learn that car is similar to truck even if the
two never directly co-occur. This happens because car
and truck both occur near the same types of words.
Similarly, because car and net rarely appear in the
same or similar contexts, according to the distributional
hypothesis, they are not likely to be related.
Due in part to the models’ successes at explaining
human data, as well as the greater availability of text
corpora, the field of distributional semantic models has
grown enormously over the past two decades. There
are now dozens of models in the literature, each with its
own strengths and weaknesses. Rather than focusing
on the technical differences among the various models,
we instead focus on the psychological mechanisms that
are used to build semantic representations. This allows
us to organize distributional semantic models into five
families: 1) Passive Co-occurrence, 2) Latent
Abstraction, 3) Predictive, 4) Bayesian, and 5)
Retrieval-Based. For technical differences among the
models, we refer the reader to Riordan and Jones
(2011) or Turney and Pantel (2010).
While all distributional semantic models are based
on the distributional hypothesis, the families of models
differ in theoretically important ways in terms of the
mechanisms they posit for how distributional
information is learned, and the type of information that
is stored in the semantic representation. They thus
differ with respect to how they model abstraction. These
mechanisms range from simple Hebbian learning to
Bayesian inference and reinforcement learning. In
addition to differences in learning mechanisms, these
families also differ in when they hypothesize that
semantic abstraction takes place from episodic
experience. Some models suffer from psychological
implausibility in that they abstract meaning via a
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learning mechanism that is applied only after all
episodes have been learned, whereas others
accumulate semantic information continuously as
experience unfolds. In contrast, there are other models,
like the exemplar models described earlier, that posit
that only episodic traces are stored, and semantic
abstraction is an artifact of retrieval from episodic
memory. A challenge for such models is to account for
evidence suggesting that episodic memories for one’s
entire life can be lost without losing access to semantic
knowledge (see Tulving, 2002 for review). One
possibility is that in such cases, the ability to explicitly
retrieve episodic memories is lost, but the episodic
traces themselves remain in some form. If true, these
traces could allow for a type of implicit retrieval that
supports semantic abstraction. For an in-depth review
of the theoretical claims of different models, see Jones,
Willits, and Dennis (2015). Below, we highlight only the
main properties of the five families of models.

7.1. Passive Co-occurrence Models
Members of the family of passive co-occurrence
models all share the characteristic that they simply
count the co-occurrence frequency among words within
an “attentional context”. The size of the attentional
context is usually based loosely on working memory
capacity, such that co-occurrences might be counted
within, for example, a several-word moving window or a
sentence, but rarely a full paragraph. In this sense, this
family theoretically implements ideas of Hebbian
learning from repeated stimulus pairings. Hence,
models of this type are unsupervised learning models.
Theoretically, they posit that sophisticated semantic
representations are the product of a relatively simple
associative count mechanism operating on statistical
regularities in the linguistic environment. These models
are therefore quite direct instantiations of Firth’s (1957)
famous claim that “you shall know a word by the
company it keeps”.
One major benefit to these models is that they are
incremental learners. In other words, they develop their
semantic representations continuously as experience
unfolds. This allows them to make predictions about
how representations change and “develop” as a
function of the statistics that the model experiences. To
relate passive co-occurrence models to the cognitivelyoriented theories introduced in Section 3, passive cooccurrence models could be construed as modern
instantiations of prototype models because statistical
tendencies are, in effect, prototypes.
Perhaps the earliest passive co-occurrence model
was the Hyperspace Analog to Language (HAL; Lund &
Burgess, 1996). HAL simply slides a fixed width window
(typically 5 to 10 words) across a text corpus, counting
distance-weighted co-occurrences between words and
storing these in a “long-term memory” matrix. Each
word’s semantic representation in the matrix is a
function of the distance between it and every other word

within the window across learning. In effect, HAL
produces a similarity space, with words that are similar
distances from the same other words being in the same
region of space (i.e., having similar meanings).
Considering HAL’s simplicity, it has been able to explain
a large amount of human data, ranging from semantic
priming to categorization (Burgess & Lund, 2000). A
model similar to HAL was used to predict human fMRI
brain activations when thinking about features of
concepts given the concept’s name and a picture
(Mitchell et al., 2008). The original model has spawned
several new versions with features that more carefully
approximate human cognitive abilities (Shaoul &
Westbury, 2010).
Another
approach
to
building
semantic
representations using passive co-occurrence is
commonly referred to as Random Vector Accumulation
models (e.g., BEAGLE; Jones & Mewhort, 2007). These
models treat each word as a random vector (of arbitrary
dimensionality) such that initially, dog and cat are
represented as being no more similar to one another
than are dog and bike. Then, each time a word is
experienced, its representation is summed together with
all of the other vectors in its context (e.g., with the
vectors of all of the other words in the sentence). As a
consequence, across learning, a word’s vector
becomes a composite pattern of distributed activity
reflecting its history of co-occurrence with other words.
This means that, because dog and cat occur in similar
contexts, across learning they move closer together in
semantic space, whereas bike, due to not occurring in
such similar contexts, moves further away. Thus, these
models calculate “co-occurrence” differently than other
models in that rather than calculating frequencies (i.e.,
rather than performing counts) to form semantic
representations, they form representations by summing
together all the vectors that constitute a word’s context.
Although the passive models we have described
learn from first-order co-occurrence, they are not limited
to representing first-order statistical relationships. For
example, the distributed representations of Random
Vector Accumulation models such as BEAGLE end up
having rich higher-order statistical relationships—even
without direct co-occurrence, the model develops
similar representations between words that appear in
similar contexts. Thus, passive co-occurrence models
show that sophisticated semantic representations can
emerge via applying a simple Hebbian-based count to
episodic co-occurrences.

7.2. Latent Abstraction Models
Latent Abstraction models also record the frequency
of co-occurrence of words across linguistic contexts.
However, rather than simply counting co-occurrences,
they go a step further by reducing the dimensionality of
the “episodic” matrix into an abstracted, lower
dimensional “semantic” matrix. Hence, all models of this
type posit a cognitive process that operates on episodic
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experiences, reducing those experiences in such a way
that it induces higher-order “latent” semantic
relationships. Typically, latent abstraction models
implement data reduction via mechanisms such as
principal components analysis or factor analysis.
Because latent abstraction models borrow dimensional
reduction methods from statistics, they can only learn in
batch—all episodic traces must first be represented
before the learning mechanism can be applied (but see
Olney, 2011). Thus, how they acquire semantic
representations seems psychologically implausible.
However, they are worth discussing because once the
representations
are
acquired,
the
resulting
representations appear to be quite plausible.
The best-known latent abstraction model is Latent
Semantic Analysis (LSA; Landauer & Dumais, 1997).
LSA begins with a word-by-document frequency matrix
from a large text corpus. This is reduced into a
semantic space in which two words can be very similar
if they occurred in sufficiently similar contexts, even if
they never directly co-occur (e.g., synonyms). The
learning process in LSA is obviously not meant to
simulate what humans do—we are unlikely to represent
our lifetime of episodic experiences all at once and then
factor that matrix. Landauer and Dumais were clear that
humans do not use the same kind of dimensional
reduction technique to learn semantics but, rather, that
they use “some cognitive mechanism that achieves the
same goal” (p. 218). While what that mechanism might
be remains elusive, LSA has inspired many similar
latent abstraction models (e.g. COALS; Rhode,
Gonnerman, & Plaut, 2009) that have been among the
most successful in the literature at explaining human
data in a variety of semantic tasks.

7.3. Predictive Models
Members of the family of predictive distributional
semantic models also produce abstract distributed
representations of word meanings, but their learning
mechanisms are based on predictive coding and errordriven learning, two principles that are core to theories
of reinforcement learning. Most of these models are
connectionist in architecture. For example, early
recurrent connectionist models such as those studied
by St. John and McClelland (1990) and Elman (1990)
learn a distributed pattern of elements across their
hidden layers that reflects each word’s co-occurrence
with other words (as in HAL, described earlier) in a
continuous (technically, infinite) window. Rogers and
McClelland (2004) likewise studied the ability of classic
feedforward Rumelhart networks to learn distributed
representations from simple languages, and found that
very sophisticated (even hierarchical) higher-order
relations naturally emerged after sufficient experience.
Both recurrent (e.g., Elman, 1990) and feed-forward
(e.g., Rogers & McClelland, 2004) supervised networks
learn by feeding activation forward through the network
to generate its predicted output, and then derive an

error signal—the difference between the predicted
output and the actual value observed in the training
corpus. This signal is used to backpropagate
(Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986) the error through
the layers of the network to increase the likelihood that
the correct output will be predicted given the input in the
future. While early predictive models produced
interesting generalization behavior, they required many
passes through the data to learn stable representations,
and did not scale well beyond small artificial languages
as effectively as did latent abstraction models such as
LSA. Nonetheless, such models are interesting
because by constraining the size of the hidden layers,
they develop representations that are more akin to
latent semantic variables (c.f. LSA) than to simple
passive co-occurrence.
There has been a recent resurgence of interest in
predictive models of distributional semantics. Howard et
al. (2011) trained a predictive version of the Temporal
Context Model, a recurrent model of error-driven
hippocampal learning, on a large text corpus and
demonstrated impressive performance on word
association tasks. The predictive Temporal Context
Model associates local item representations to a
gradually drifting representation of time (temporal
context) to learn distributed semantic representations
from a text corpus. Although it differs considerably from
classic connectionist models in architecture, it shares
the relation to error-driven reinforcement learning
theories.
A new type of model that has gained immense
popularity recently due to its performance in the field of
computational linguistics is the “neural embedding”
model. Perhaps the best known is Google’s word2vec
model (Mikolov et al., 2013), partially due to its
remarkable performance on semantic tasks. But a key
difference between this model and other systems led by
industry (that are engineered to perform a single task
well) is that word2vec is based on the same theoretical
reinforcement-learning
architecture
that
original
recurrent language models were based on (Elman,
1990). Word2vec is a predictive model with hidden and
recurrent layers, very much like the predictive Temporal
Context Model, but operating on discrete time steps. It
uses several training “tricks” to scale up to extremely
large word corpora that Elman’s (1990) networks were
never able to. Word2vec has had a major impact on the
machine learning literature because it outperforms
every other semantic model on a large battery of
semantic tasks while using an architecture on which the
field was no longer focused (see Baroni et al., 2014 for
a careful comparison of state-of-the-art co-occurrence
models and word2vec). Hollis and Westbury (2016)
recently explored the organizational principles that
word2vec is discovering to construct its semantic
representations, concluding that the model primarily
converges on affective dimensions of language when
constructing semantic representations, very much in the
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spirit of Osgood’s early theories of meaning (Osgood,
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). Despite its excellent
scaling properties and performance when trained on
massive amounts of text, it remains to be seen if
word2vec is an appropriate cognitive model of learning
at human-like scales. For example, Asr, Willits, and
Jones (2016) found that word2vec had much more
difficulty learning simple semantic categories from childdirected speech using the CHILDES corpus than did a
simple principal components analysis-based latent
abstraction model.
An important benefit of predictive models is that they
embody principles that seem to be ubiquitous within the
cognitive system (cf. the recent interest on prediction
during language comprehension, Altmann & Mirkovic,
2009). Moreover, the simplicity of Elman’s (1990)
recurrent network is inherently attractive because of its
transparency regarding how, and what, it learns.
However, the issue of scaling, both scaling up to
realistically large adult-sized input, and scaling down to
realistically small, child-sized input, is an important one.
Being concerned with scaling is no different (for a
cognitive psychologist) than being concerned with the
hypothesis that links principles of learning and semantic
organization to the architecture of the brain that
embodies such principles.

7.4. Bayesian Models
Bayesian models of cognition have seen immense
growth over the past decade, both due to their success
at explaining human data across many cognitive levels,
and because the approach offers a unifying theoretical
framework to understand human cognition as rational
probabilistic inference. The Bayesian approach
assumes that the pattern of word co-occurrences
across documents is generated by mixtures of semantic
topics, where a topic is a probability distribution over
words, and a word is a probability distribution over
topics. The topics themselves are estimated from the
observed data using Bayesian inference.
It is helpful to think of topics as folders on a shelf,
where each folder contains words that are most
associated with that topic, and each possible topic has
one folder. For example, reaching into the finance folder
you are more likely to pull out words such as market,
bank, or investment than giraffe, zebra, or hippo (this
same principle underlies LSA, described earlier).
Whereas all folders contain all words, their probabilities
differ. Giraffe is much more likely to be pulled out of the
zoo folder than is investment. In the model, it is
assumed that documents were generated by weighted
mixtures of these topic folders. A news article
describing a new fertility drug may have been
generated by a recipe that calls for a mix of topics
including 1 part health, 2 parts pharmaceutical, a dash
of reproduction, and a pinch of finance. This “recipe”
example is a slight oversimplification of a graded

process in that all topics may be sampled from, but their
contributions are probabilistic.
Hence, a topic model estimates the most likely set
and mixture of topics that would have generated the
text. When applied to a large general text corpus, the
model presumably uncovers general semantic topics
that represent the shared world knowledge across
individuals. When applied to a more specific text
corpus, a topic model can uncover the author-specific
topics that are most likely to have generated the
observed data; this type of analysis can be very useful
to explore knowledge expertise. For example, Murdock,
Allen, and DeDeo (2015) recently used topic models to
explore Darwin’s reading notebooks, providing new
insights about how his theory of natural selection
emerged from the semantic path of his readings and
writings.
Topic models differ from traditional distributional
semantic models in theoretically important ways that
deserve some highlighting here. First, topic models are
generative. They specify a process by which words in
documents are generated as a pattern of topic mixtures.
Whereas abstraction models such as LSA do uncover
variance
components
representing
word
cooccurrences in the text corpus, the process is more one
of data mining and cannot easily be reversed to explain
how future documents would be generated from the
model.
Second, whereas most distributional semantic
models are geometric models that represent a word as
a point in high-dimensional space, topic models
represent words as probability distributions. As a result,
topic models naturally represent asymmetric semantic
relations that are seen in human data, but that are
difficult to account for with geometric models. For
example, in free association norms, asymmetries are
common: baby is a much more likely response to stork
than stork is to baby. In a spatial representation,
however, the distance between baby and stork must be
the same regardless of which one serves as the cue.
This symmetry need not be the case in topic models,
where p(baby|stork) > p(stork|baby). Griffiths Steyvers,
and Tenenbaum (2007) demonstrate several examples
of how topic models explain patterns of human
semantic data that violate symmetry and cannot be
explained by purely geometric models (but see Jones,
Gruenenfelder, & Recchia, 2011).

7.5. Retrieval-Based Models
A final family of distributional semantic model has
seen considerably less attention in the literature, but
nonetheless deserves mention because members of
this family make a radically different theoretical claim
about semantic representation. Retrieval-based models
essentially posit that there is no such thing as semantic
memory, only episodic memory. Thus, they have
considerable overlap with the exemplar-based models
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introduced in Section 3.1 and in the chapter in this
Handbook by Ashby and Valentin.
In retrieval-based models, semantic representations
are an artifact (i.e., an emergent property) of retrieval
from episodic memory. Most models of this family posit
that each experience with a word lays down a unique
trace in episodic memory. When a word is encountered,
all of its previous experienced contexts are reactivated,
and the process of retrieval from episodic memory
incidentally recruits episodes of contexts that are quite
similar. The aggregate of all episodes in the retrieved
representation (implemented as a multi-dimensional
vector) contains higher-order relationships of semantic
similarity. Even though two words (e.g., synonyms) may
never have co-occurred in the same context, their
retrieved vectors will be similar to each other.
The constructed semantics model of Kwantes (2005)
is an example of a retrieval-based version of LSA. This
model is based heavily on Minerva 2 (Hintzman, 1986),
a multiple-trace memory model that originally was
designed as an existence proof that “schema
abstraction”, that is, the process by which a prototype
appears to be abstracted from exemplars (Posner &
Keele, 1968), could be an emergent phenomenon from
an episodic memory model. This was a significant
demonstration because schema abstraction had been
used as strong evidence of multiple memory systems—
both episodic and semantic systems, consistent with
Tulving’s classic taxonomy. Kwantes’ constructed
semantics model is similar to LSA, but the data
reduction mechanism is a natural byproduct of episodic
retrieval. In addition, the semantic representation itself
is never stored; it simply is an emergent artifact of
episodic retrieval.
Retrieval-based models therefore have two major
distinctions from all other distributional semantic
models. First, semantic memory in these models does
not exist as a stored structure; the model stores only
episodes. This essentially is equivalent to storing the
word-by-context matrix that is used as input to other
models, such as LSA or Topics. Second, there is no
abstraction mechanism when learning. In contrast to
models such as LSA, Topics, BEAGLE, and word2vec
that all apply a data reduction mechanism to construct
an abstracted semantic representation for storage
during input (singular value decomposition, Bayesian
inference, backpropagation), retrieval-based models
essentially do this at output. In other words, all other
models place the abstraction at encoding, whereas
retrieval models place abstraction at retrieval. In
addition, the abstraction is not a purposeful mechanism
per se. Instead, abstraction incidentally occurs because
our memory retrieval mechanism is reconstructive.
Hence, semantic memory in retrieval-based models is
essentially an accident due to our imperfect memory
retrieval process.

7.6 Challenges for Distributional Semantic
Models
Despite their impressive success at accounting for
human data, distributional semantic models face some
challenges as psychological models of human semantic
representation. First and foremost, they routinely are
criticized because they learn exclusively from text, that
is, they construct semantic representations by applying
a processing mechanism to statistical regularities in
how words are used in a text corpus. In contrast,
human semantic representations are constructed from a
lifetime of linguistic and perceptual experience.
Perceptual information is an inherent part of the
organization of human semantic memory, but much of
this information cannot be learned from statistics in a
text corpus—it must be learned from multisensory
experience (see the chapter by Matheson & Barsalou).
The challenge resulting from distributional semantic
models being limited to text input however, is not a
limitation of them as learning models per se, but is
rather a limitation in the type of data we are currently
able to feed to them. Hence, it is possible that a
distributional semantic learning model could be applied
to perceptual and motoric information as well as
linguistic information to construct a more refined
semantic representation, if we could get the model to
“see”, etc. Indeed, such a suggestion was made in the
discussion section of the original LSA article (Landauer
& Dumais, 1997). Recent distributional semantic
models have taken up this challenge, constructing joint
probabilistic or composite semantic spaces that
integrate complementary information sources from both
linguistic and perceptual streams. “Perception” in these
models is either represented using semantic feature
norms (McRae et al., 2005; Vinson & Vigliocco, 2008),
geon-based representations (Kievit-Kylar & Jones,
2011), or computer vision algorithms applied to natural
images (Bruni, Tran, & Baroni, 2014). For an extended
discussion, see the chapter in this Volume by Cai and
Vigliocco. Reasonable success has been observed in
several theoretical frameworks, including Bayesian
models (Andrews, Vigliocco, & Vinson, 2009; Steyvers,
2009), random vector models (Jones & Recchia, 2010),
and retrieval-based models (Johns & Jones, 2012). It
remains to be seen whether, by providing distributional
semantic models with not only linguistic and perceptual
information, but also the ability to interact with the
environment (cf. autonomous robots), such models
could mimic human representations not only with
respect to processing (e.g., the predictions that they
make) and organization (e.g., similarity space), but also
with respect to format (e.g., with parts supporting action
also representing action knowledge).
A second challenge faced by distributional semantic
models is that most do not reflect the evidence that the
episodic and semantic systems are at least partially
distinct (see Section 4). Some neurobiologically inspired
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computational models of semantic memory, however,
do posit some distinction between these systems,
taking inspiration from the different computational
properties of the neocortical and hippocampal
structures that support memory (Howard, Shankar, &
Jagadisan, 2011; Kumaran, Hassabis, & McClelland,
2016; Kumaran & McClelland, 2012; McClelland,
McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Norman & O’Reilly,
2003; Schapiro, Turk-Browne, Botvinick, & Norman,
2017). Most of these models are based on
Complementary Learning Systems theory (McClelland,
McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995). According to this
theory, episodic memory is supported by hippocampal
structures that rapidly encode distinct episodes by
means of large changes in connectivity within the
hippocampus and between the hippocampus and
neocortex. In contrast, semantic memory is supported
by slower and smaller changes in neocortical
connectivity that encode regularities encountered
across multiple episodes. Although few of the models
based on Complementary Learning Systems have been
scaled up to cope with realistically-sized conceptual
spaces (but see Howard et al., 2011), their role in
potentially constraining psychological theories of
semantic memory is undeniably important and
highlights the value of using neurobiological
considerations to shape computational models.

7.7 Summary of Computational Models of
Semantic Representation
Because we have discussed some of the limitations
of distributional semantic models, it might be tempting
to think that these limitations, coupled with the diversity
of the models, compromise their contribution to
psychological theories of semantic memory. However,
even the simplest computational models of learning,
abstraction, and semantic representation (e.g. Elman’s
recurrent network model; Elman, 1990) can strongly
influence psychological theory. Concepts such as
prediction, abstraction, generalization, latent variables,
and semantic space can be better understood by
having an implemented computational perspective on
how they might arise in any computational system. And
even if it seems implausible that people wait to process
the input until all of it has been gathered (c.f. the Latent
Semantic models described in Section 7.2), the idea
that there exists latent structure is important when
considering what is encoded in semantic memory, and
how it might be derived from experience. Similarly,
although the idea that there is no such thing as
semantic memory per se (c.f. the Retrieval-Based
models of Section 7.3) challenges classical
interpretations of the distinction between experience
and abstraction, the retrieval-based models that make
this claim are conceptually similar to the exemplarbased psychological models (Section 3.1) that posit that
the process of retrieval, rather than encoding, may be
responsible for how it is that people can generalize from

one experience to another. Thus, even principles that,
on the surface, seem psychologically unlikely may
ultimately prove to inform our understanding of
cognitive processing. Finally, the models inspired by
Complementary Learning Systems theory (7.6) make
clear that fully understanding semantic memory will
require better knowledge of the relationship between it
and episodic memory, as well as an understanding of
the neurobiology.

8. Semantic memory: A common
thread, and a look ahead
The idea of abstraction recurs throughout this
chapter. This is appropriate because abstraction is
arguably at the root of semantic knowledge. In the
remainder of this chapter, we revisit some essential
roles of abstraction and raise questions for future
research.

8.1 The roles of abstraction
We have suggested that the process of abstraction
is one that, supported by sensitivity to statistical
regularities, allows people to form and store (or, on
exemplar/retrieval-based models, allows us to compute
at retrieval) “abstracted” semantic information from our
experiences (Section 2). This abstracted information
would reflect what is most common across our
experiences with a given object or event, such that
idiosyncratic properties, like a leaf sticking to your dog’s
coat, would be minimized. It is through this kind of
abstraction that we are able to discern what various
objects and events have in common, and group them
together into concepts.
We also described abstraction in terms of levels of
abstraction (Section 6). The idea here is that
information may be represented with different degrees
of precision or detail, with representations containing
more detail being referred to as “less abstract” or “at
lower levels of abstraction” and representations
containing less detail being referred to as “more
abstract” or “at higher levels of abstraction”. For
example, knowing that something is a canary requires
more detailed semantic knowledge than knowing that
something is a bird. In hierarchical descriptions of
semantic knowledge (Section 3.1), the levels in the
hierarchy can also be thought of as levels of
abstraction, with superordinate (i.e., more inclusive)
levels in the hierarchy corresponding to higher levels of
abstraction (Rosch, 1978). Evidence suggests that
depending upon the level at which we classify things
(e.g., classifying a labrador as either a dog or a living
thing), we rely on different brain regions to varying
degrees (Section 6; cf. Hsu et al., 2011).
How are these different kinds of abstraction related?
It is easy to imagine a model in which the way that the
process of abstraction is implemented produces
different levels of abstraction. For instance, it is possible
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that sensitivity to statistical regularities across time not
only allows us to derive information from across
instances that is not apparent in any individual instance
(as described in Section 2), but also that sensitivity to
regularities across multiple features produces more
complex relationships among features than could be
apparent in any individual modality (Damasio 1989).
Such sensitivities may result in higher level
representations that have less perceptual detail and are
further removed from the perceptual input in any single
modality. Subsequently combining these higher level
representations could produce yet higher level
representations that even less directly reflect the
unimodal perceptual input (for discussion, see Binder,
2016). Thus, sensitivity to cross-modal regularities
could produce multiple levels of abstraction.
An important open question is how this cross-modal
integration process might happen. In particular, to what
extent does “the integration of multiple aspects of
reality... depend on the time-locked co-activation of
geographically separate sites of neural activity within
sensory and motor cortices...” (Damasio, 1989, p. 39)?
Interesting areas of research are the possible roles of
various
frequency
bands
when
considering
synchronous neural activity, and the possible roles of
coherent oscillatory activity in integrating information
from distributed brain regions (Singer & Gray, 1995).
Several researchers have been exploring this question
with respect to auditory and visual information
(Widmann et al., 2007; Schneider et al., 2008;
Bastiaansen et al., 2008; Van Ackeren &
Rueschemeyer 2014).

8.2 Can abstraction help explain the
representation of abstract concepts and
features?
We would be remiss to leave the topic of abstraction
without considering an important type of semantic
knowledge that we have not yet considered--knowledge
about abstract concepts. So far, we have focused on
what might be termed “simple concepts”, that is, the
kind of object and action concepts that we learn early
on during development, and that we use in our basic
interactions with the world. However, concrete concepts
can contain features (e.g., the functions of many
objects, such as used to tell time) that do not have
obvious sensorimotor correlates. Similarly, much of our
language is about concepts that have no physical
manifestation, such as intellectual discourse or
presidential debates. What sensory or motor attributes,
or abstraction across those attributes, might constitute
our representations of purpose or hope, concepts that
seem to be devoid of physical and perceptual
instantiation?
The predominant theory of how abstract concepts
are represented emphasizes the importance of
emotional or affective information in their representation

(Vigliocco et al., 2009). Neural investigations have
provided support for this idea in that brain regions
associated with emotion processing are more active
when processing abstract than concrete words
(Vigliocco et al., 2014). However, while this account
may help explain the representation of abstract
concepts that do indeed involve emotion (e.g., love),
many abstract concepts are not as clearly associated
with emotion (e.g., purpose). It has therefore been
suggested that abstract concepts for which emotional
and/or sensory and motor attributes are lacking are
more dependent on linguistic (Paivio 1991), and
contextual/situational information (Barsalou & WiemerHastings, 2005). That is, their mention in different
contexts (i.e., episodes) may gradually lead us to an
understanding of their meaning in the absence of
sensorimotor content (Pulvermuller, 2013). Neural
investigations have supported at least the linguistic
portion of this proposal. Brain regions known to support
language show greater involvement during the
processing of abstract relative to concrete concepts
(see Wang et al., 2010, for review).
If contextual/situational information and linguistic
information (including verbal labels) are indeed
important components of abstract knowledge, these
should serve as important inputs into the process of
abstraction that we have already described. Although
we focused on sensorimotor inputs in our prior
descriptions of this process, in principle it should
function over any input from which statistical regularities
can be derived. In fact, the computational models
described in Section 7 are a testament to the ability of
abstraction processes to function over nonsensorimotor input.

8.3 Is there differential reliance on different
types of semantic information across
development and across levels of
abstraction?
The question of whether abstract knowledge relies
more on linguistic or situational information compared to
concrete concepts raises the question of whether other
aspects of semantic knowledge also rely more on some
types of information more than others. For instance, as
discussed in Section 5.1, labels may serve as an
“invitation to form categories” in that they encourage
attending to commonalities between things that share
the same label (Waxman & Markow, 1995). It is
therefore possible that for categories for which the
commonalities among instances are particularly hard to
identify (such as superordinate categories, like “animal”
or “tool”), labels may play a particularly important role in
that without them, the commonalities would go
unnoticed. Relatedly, it is possible that one reason that
superordinate categories are later to develop is that
they are particularly dependent on the ability to focus on
specific aspects of a representation (e.g., the label),
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and the ability to focus in this way depends on
prefrontal cortex, the brain region that takes longest to
develop (see Sloutsky, 2010 for discussion). It will be
interesting to discover whether the development of
prefrontal cortex indeed influences the extent to which
children rely on labels versus sensorimotor information
when learning new semantic knowledge (see Section
4).

9. An integrated memory system
The data and theories that we have discussed in this
chapter show that semantic memory should not be
considered as fully independent from either episodic or
implicit memory. In this section, we first review the
evidence that semantic memory is part of an integrated
memory system, and we then consider an implication of
this integration.

9.1 Episodic, implicit, and semantic
memories
There are several reasons to believe that episodic
memory is an important component of semantic
memory. First, without a functioning episodic memory,
acquiring new semantic knowledge is slow and
laborious, suggesting that episodic memory typically is
important for the development of semantic knowledge
(Section 4). Second, for most concepts, the acquisition
process begins with a specific episode, although that
episode may not later be consciously linked to the
concept. This means that early in the process of
learning about a new object, our knowledge may be
heavily (or at least more heavily than later) influenced
by episodic information. Conversely, there is evidence
that our semantic knowledge supports our ability to
acquire new episodic information (Kan et al., 2009). Our
everyday experience is thus due to an interplay
between episodic and semantic memory (see Altmann,
2017, for an account of this interplay in the context of
language
and
event
comprehension).
Exemplar/retrieval-based models of semantic memory
blur the distinction further, essentially eliminating
semantic representations and instead positing that
semantic knowledge is an emergent property of the
process of retrieving episodes (see Sections 3.1 and
7.5).
Unlike episodic memory, implicit memory is typically
defined as knowledge that we never had conscious
access to, but nevertheless affects our responses (e.g.,
procedural knowledge, such as how to ride a bike, or
perceptual priming whereby our response to a stimulus
is facilitated by prior exposure to a related stimulus,
despite that fact that we are not aware of the
relationship). By positing that the sensory and motor
regions that are active when we perceive or interact
with an object also have a role in representing it,
sensorimotor-based models of semantic memory make
clear predictions that implicit knowledge has a role in

semantic knowledge. For instance, according to
sensorimotor-based models, knowledge that is not easy
to verbalize, such as how to ride a bike, can be part of
your representation of bike, and how you position your
hand and fingers while using a pencil can be part of
your representation of pencil. Similarly, sensorimotorbased models posit that similarity based on implicit
knowledge, such as how objects are manipulated,
should shape how semantic knowledge is organized, an
assertion for which ample evidence exists (e.g., Myung
et al., 2006).

9.2 Do concepts really change across time
and differ between individuals?
Sensorimotor-based models of semantic memory
are committed to representations being experiencebased. And experiences necessarily differ across time
and across individuals. This may seem to create a
problem for sensorimotor-based models because most
people have the intuition that their semantic
representations are static, and that when they talk to
others about them, they are talking about the same
things. We suggest that both of these intuitions are
false (albeit not entirely false). First, given that semantic
representations
necessarily
change
across
development (see Section 4), we must at least accept
changes then. This raises the question of when, if ever,
development should be considered to end, and,
relatedly, how to consider the changes that result from
the acquisition of new, or more detailed semantic
knowledge in adulthood. Second, as described in
Section 5, there are clear individual differences in the
representation of semantic knowledge that result from
individual differences in the experiences that make up
both our episodic memories and our implicit memories.
Despite these differences, we still (usually) seem to
be referring to approximately the same things when we
refer to an apple (whether the same goes for more
abstract concepts like justice is open to debate). We
suggest that the commonalities in human experience,
due in part to the commonalities in the structure of the
world in which we live, and in part to our common
sensory and motor systems, allow our semantic
representations, and the labels that refer to them, to be
similar enough for successful communication (for
further consideration of this point, see Casasanto &
Lupyan, 2015; Connell & Lynott, 2014; Taylor & Zwaan,
2009; Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016). Moreover, if, as
suggested by Complementary Learning Systems
theory, semantic memory changes slowly via small
changes in neocortical connectivity, we need not worry
that sudden changes in our experiences will radically
alter our conceptual knowledge. Rather, we would
expect changes due to experience to build gradually as
our experiences accumulate. Thus, an integrated model
of the semantic memory system must take account of
the episodic and the implicit knowledge that influence
semantic memory across the lifespan.
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10. A final note
The study of semantic memory is more than just the
study of what we know and how we know it. To the
extent that our knowledge shapes who we are, it is the
study of who we are and why. A lesson to be learned
from the insights that underpin the theories, data, and
models that we have described is that our
understanding
of
human
memory
relies
on
complementary
investigations
into
behavior,
neurobiology, and computation. Moreover, each of
these perspectives is strengthened by considering the
transition from the immature state to its mature
counterpart. The challenge is to develop a model of
human memory that reflects, across the lifespan, both
the computations afforded by its neurobiology as well
as the behaviors that these computations produce.
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